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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION; H. J. COR-
LEISSEN, Chairman, LAY T 0 N 
MAXFIELD and LORENZO J. 
BOTT, members of the State Road 
Commission, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
Appellant, 
BRACK HOWARD NOBLE and ANN 
C. NOBLE, his wife; ELMO ENG-
LAND; E. J. HUBER; and PACIF-
IC NATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8544 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment 
entered thereon awarding the defendants Noble the sum 
of $150,000.00 together with interest, exclusive of costs and 
to the date of judgment, in the further sum of $7,321.05. 
The verdict stems from a condemnation proceeding com-
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menced by the State of Utah through its Road Commission 
for the taking of approximately eight and a fraction acres 
of land for highwa:y purposes situate in Salt Lake and Davis 
Counties, Utah. Trial was had in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, commencing on the 3rd 
day of April, 1956, the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, 
presiding. The State Road Commission had secured an 
Order of Immediate Occupancy on the 22nd of July, 1955, 
and at the time of the trial the improvements on the land 
had been removed and actual construction of the road bed 1 
was in progress; this made it impossible for the jury upon 
a view of the premises to observe the property in its orig-
inal condition at the time of the taking. The importance 
of this fact will be made clear to this Court later in this 
brief. 
By stipulation and motion to dismiss the defendants 
Elmo England and E. J. Huber were eliminated from the 
cause (R. 97, 98, 99) ; the Pacific Mutual Life Assurance 
Company filed its answer (R. 19) and amended answer 
( R. 35) asserting its note and mortgage as against the 
defendants Noble. The Pre-trial Order (R. 32, 33) limited 
the issues to the question of damages. The State's Motion 
for New Trial (R. 76) was denied (R. 78). Notice of ap-
peal from the judgment and the whole thereof was, by 
your appellant, timely filed- (R. 93). 
At the trial the State first placed into evidence its 
Exhibit 1, a map of the land to be condemned (R. 108-112); 
thereafter the defendants Noble undertook the burden of 
proving the quantum of damages for the taking. This, we 
think the record shows, the defendants failed to do. 
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First witness for the defendants, Albert Z. Richards, 
(R. 112) stated that he was a civil engineer with a B. S. 
Degree, 1939, from the University of Utah; that he had 
been hired by the defendants in November of 1955 to cross 
section the area of the property condemned and to deter-
mine the quantity and quality of the materials to be found 
thereon (R. 114) ; that he employed a driller and supervised 
the drilling operations. The witness concluded that there 
were one million two hundred ninety nine thousand and 
eight hundred fifty eight tons of material (1,299,858) in 
the tract of which 355,222 tons was "muck" sand and 
944,646 tons a mixture of sand and gravel (R. 123). On 
cross examination the witness testified that he could esti-
mate within 10% [after the drilling of but four test holes] 
how much material in cubic yards there was beneath the 
surface of the eight-acre tract (R. 134) ; but the witness 
also was of the opinion that gravel mining was pretty much 
like gold mining and that one does not know what is there 
until he gets there (R. 212). 
Second witness for the defense was Brack Howard 
Noble, one of the owners of the property being condemned 
(R. 136). The witness testified as to when he acquired the 
property; as to the improvements thereon ; as to the busi-
nesses he conducted thereon, i. e., sand and gravel, trailer 
court and the selling of antiques (R. 138). Over plaintiff's 
objection (R. 147) defendants' Exhibit No. 28, colored 
photo, was admitted in evidence (R. 151). Defendants' 
Exhibits 29 to 41 inclusive, colored photos (R. 164), were 
offered and admitted over plaintiff's objection (R. 165). 
The witness was permitted to testify, (a) as to his income 
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from the property-1947 to 1951, $5,000.00 per year; (R. 
155) ; 1952, $9,702.00; 1953, $14,221.85; 1954, $16,436.00; 
1955, $20,056.55 (R. 156) ; (b) as to its value, $300,000.00; 
(R. 163) and (c) that as long as he lived he could net 
$20,000.00 per year therefrom (R. 163). On cross exam-
ination the witness stated that the value of the sand and 
gravel would be approximately $200,000.00 (R. 168); he 
had some difficulty in explaining how he arrived at that 
figure (R. 169-171) ; the witness also had some trouble in 
accounting for the remaining $100,000.00 in terms of valu-
ation of the properties exclusive of the sand and gravel (R. 
178-181). The witness admitted that the colors portrayed 
by the photos [Defendants' Exhibits 28 through 41] did not 
represent the true colors of the landscape (R. 185-187). 
The witness estimated that it would take him 15 years to 
dispose of the muck sand on the premises (R. 195), and 
admitted that in order to do so he would have to do better 
than he had done to date (R. 195). 
Don R. Bass, next witness for the defendants (R. 195), 
testified that he was a driller for Boyle Brothers Drilling 
Company of Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 196); that he con-
ducted the drilling of four test holes on the defendants' 
property and made explanation as to depth and kind of 
materials found (R. 195-201). 
Fourth witness for the defendants was M. L. Schoen-
feld. The witness was a sand and gravel operator. He testi-
fied as to the nature of the sand and gravel materials, their 
uses, the demand for, the price of, and as to the existing 
supply (R. 217-239). The witness stated that there was a 
severe shortage of muck sand (R. 225), however, on cross 
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examination, this witness said he had not sold over 30,000 
tons of sand in 1955 nor over 50,000 tons in 1954 (R. 231) ; 
the witness admitted that if 100,000 tons of sand and gravel 
per year could be sold off the Noble property, it would take 
13 years to exhaust the supply (R. 232, 236). The witness 
stated that the value of the muck sand on the Noble prop-
erty was 25c per ton in place (R. 222); that he would pay 
25c for it (R. 228), at the same time admitting that under 
his lease agreement he was purchasing it for 10c per ton 
(R. 228); that under his former lease he had paid 10c per 
ton (R. 237). He did not say what quantity of sand he 
would be willing to purchase, if any, from the defendants at 
25c per ton. 
Fifth witness for the defendants was a Mr. Joseph P. 
Howa (R. 240) . This witness was qualified as an expert; 
he was a "civil engineer" (R. 240), a "construction esti-
mator" (R. 240) ; he was a "chief estimator" (R. 241) ; it 
had been his "responsibility to appraise structures already 
completed" and for six years "he had been building a repu-
tation with architects in Salt Lake City" (R. 241) ; at the 
present moment he was appraising the Mayflower Apart-
ments in Salt Lake City (R. 242). He had "estimated" the 
new Veterans Hospital in Salt Lake City (R. 242), he had 
"estimated" the Statler Hotel in Los Angeles (R. 242), he 
had appraised the Dixie Club on the Salt Lake-Davis County 
line (R. 242). At the present time, he was "Chief Managing 
Officer of the Inland Construction Company" (R. 261) . On 
cross examination, he was not an appraiser (R. 258), he 
did not "evaluate property" (R. 262), he said appraisers 
used the "Dow Service" and the "Boggs System" in arriving 
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at the value of real property (R. 262). He could not explain 
the "Dow Service" method, because, "I do not appraise 
property" (R. 262). He did not know what text books 
appraisers used and he had never heard about "McMichaels" 
(R. 262, 3); he was working in conjunction with Mr. 
Edward M. Ashton (R. 263). The witness did not know 
what the fair market value of the home on the Noble prop-
erty was, he did not know what a willing purchaser would 
pay for that hmne (R. 264); he had never claimed to be a 
"sand and gravel man" and he had never claimed to be an 
"appraiser of real property" (R. 265). These last denials 
were elicited from the witness on re-direct examination 
after the defense had qualified this witness as an expert 
appraiser. In this witness's opinion, the value of the Noble 
property was "between 250 and 275 thousand dollars" (R. 
256), and the sand and gravel in place was worth $175,-
000.00 (R. 261). This witness did rwt testify at any place 
in the record as to 'What a willing purchaser, ahle to buy but 
not required to buy, would pay for the defendants' property, 
any or all of it! (R. 240-269). 
Thereafter, the defendants called two Salt Lake City 
realtors, Mr. Thomas E. Gaddis and Mr. Sherman D. Ride-
out, who were duly qualified as experts in the realty busi-
ness. 
Mr. Gaddis never did examine the house and buildings 
on the property and he did not go on the property prior to 
one week preceding the trial ; he did not know anything 
about the property as of July, 1955 (R. 271). Over plain-
tiff's objection, the witness was permitted to testify as to 
the value of the property at the time of the taking, July 
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1955 (R. 271) ; of which he knew nothing. The witness 
declared: 
"(1) That he was acquainted with what Mr. 
Richards told him as to the number of yards of sand, 
gravel and muck sand there was on the property (R. 
273). 
"(2) That he was acquainted with the figure 
[value] that Mr. Schoenfeld had set on the sand and 
gravel (R. 273). 
"(3) That he had seen Mr. Howa's blueprints 
and was acquainted with the replacement values of 
the buildings and improvements as set by Mr. Howa 
(R. 273). 
" ( 4) That he had seen the pictures of the 
property which were in evidence" (R. 273, 4). 
Then, the witness was asked what was intended to be a 
hypothetical question as to total value of the entire prop-
erty, to which plaintiff made timely objection (R. 275). 
Thereafter the record reads as follows: 
"Q. Now, Mr. Gaddis, the question that I ask 
you is as to whether or not-what you consider to be 
a fair market value of that property, based upon the 
idea that it would be the amount that a willing seller 
would be willing-who wasn't under pressure-
would be willing to sell it to a willing buyer, who 
was desirous of purchasing the whole property and 
wasn't under pressure to do so and had the means 
to do so; what would you estimate would be the 
value of that property-the fair market value of 
that property-based upon that assumption? 
"THE COURT: That is as of July 22, '55? 
"Q. As of July 22, '55. 
"A. The ground, I place $44,625 ; the building, 
I didn't see. I didn't measure it, and, based entirely 
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on the estimate of your estimator here, he says it is 
worth $40,999. 
"THE COURT: Mr. Gaddis, you are not cor-
rectly quoting him; he didn't say that; he said it 
would cost so much to replace it. 
"A. To replace it. 
"THE COURT: He didn't give any estimate as 
to market value. 
"MR. MAW: But he stated the depreciation. 
"MR. BUDGE: That still isn't the market value. 
"A. You are asking me to make an assump-
tion-
"Q. That's right. 
"A. -based on the value of the property, of 
the value of the improvements on-in July, last 
year-
"Q. Yes. 
"A. -is that right? 
"Q. That is correct. 
"THE COURT: Now, the 'improvements' isn't 
quite it. He wants to know the market value of the 
entire piece of property ; and I am not sure that you 
can take the value of the land, then the value of the 
improvements, and add them together. They may 
not be the same. Sometimes the combination makes 
it more or less. 
"A. It is very vital to go into that point. If 
he assumes that the value of that property is $40,000 
-I didn't see that property last week-but, if I can 
assume that the valuation is correct, I would add 
that to the value of the ground. 
"Q. You may assume that. 
"A. Can I assume that? 
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"Q. Yes. 
"THE COURT: No, that isn't the value, accord-
ing-
"MR. BUDGE: No. 
"THE COURT: You must assume that the re-
placement value is so much, and that the buildings 
have depreciated in the amount of $4,000, then your 
testimony would be based on the accuracy of that, 
together with your own judgment. 
"A. I can not form a judgment on the build-
ings that have been taken away, sir. 
"THE COURT: You have to bear in mind that 
replacement value is not market value, and replace-
ment value, less depreciation, may or may not be 
market value. 
"Q. May I ask you another question with re-
spect to that? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And make your calculations, assuming 
that the replacement value of those buildings was 
$44,795, and that, in the opinion of the appraiser-
the engineer-there is $4,000 depreciation, then, 
considering your own experience with respect to 
such buildings and the information that-the im-
pressions that you have from the pictures that you 
have seen-assuming that, what would be the value 
of the whole property? 
"A. Of the whole property? When it comes 
to the gravel, can I assume-! am not a gravel man 
-I am not a gravel contractor-! am not a gravel 
anything; assuming that the information that I have, 
in talking to your engineer, assume that there are 
355,222 tons of muck and sand, which he values at 
twenty-five cents an acre, and 964,646 tons of gravel 
at ten cents an acre-
- --------~-=- ---------------
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"Q. Not an "acre" ; do you mean a ton? 
"A. Per ton, I mean-I beg your pardon-the 
total value of the sand and gravel would be $183,269. 
Now, to sum up the ground value that I placed-
"THE COURT: Just a moment, that value is 
what these witnesses said it was worth in place, but 
that doesn't say what you could sell the property for 
with that much in place. 
"A. That is true. 
"THE COURT: Your problem is, what would 
it sell for under the conditions that Mr. Maw de-
scribed, of a willing seller and willing buyer. 
"A. Assuming the figures are correct, I would 
say that the total value of the property-this is an 
assumption only-hypothetical question, as I under-
stand it-
"Q. Correct. 
"A. -would be $270,768" (R. 276, 277, 278). 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Rideout then said that a fair market value of the 
property would be $270,000.00 (R. 286, 287); a stupendous 
difference of seven hundred sixty-eight dollars ($768.00) 
and no cents. The testimony of the witness Rideout (R. 
280-288) was similar to that of the witness Gaddis and 
added nothing to the proof. The witness Rideout had no 
knowledge of the property nor its improvements as of July, 
1955. By addition and multiplication, these witnesses ar-
rived at a "value." At the conclusion of 1\ir. Rideout's testi-
mony, the following took place: 
"THE COURT: Mr. Rideout, you asked to be 
excused ; you mean from the witness stand or court-
room? 
"A. Both" (R. 288). 
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To this point in the record there is not one scintilla of 
evidence as to the "best and highest use" to which the 
property could be placed and not an iota of evidence as to 
what a willing purchaser, able to buy but not compelled to 
buy, would have paid for the Noble property on July 22, 
1955, the date of the order of occupancy. The defendants 
rest. 
The State called Sherman Burton, resident engineer 
on the project, who testified as to the materials to be found 
on the property ; the cross section thereof; the number of 
cubic yards of sand and gravel that could reasonably be 
recovered and removed therefrom (R. 292-316). 
Douglas F. Larsen, materials engineer for the Utah 
State Road Commission, was called for the State. The wit-
ness testified that it would be necessary to drill four or 
five test holes per acre, following good engineering practice, 
to determine the nature of the materials thereunder; he 
testified as to drilling operations conducted by the State on 
the property; as to the striking of a "point of refusal" at 
40 feet (R. 320), and as to encountering underground 
waters (R. 320). The witness further testified as to the 
analysis of the materials recovered from the drilling ( R. 
316-323). On cross examination the witness testified: 
"Q. Now, Mr. Larsen you testified this morn-
ing that you would have to drill four or five holes on 
an acre to determine accurately how much sand and 
gravel was in there·; is that correct? 
"A. I said I think at least four or five. 
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"Q. Do you think it would be possible to de-
termine the amount of sand and gravel in an acre, 
even with four or five holes? 
"A. I think so, with a reasonable amount of 
accuracy. 
"Q. Actually, you would have to take it all out 
to determine exactly what was there, wo11ld you not? 
"A. If you were going to determine it that 
way, yes. 
"Q. The matter of determining the amount of 
sand and gravel is highly speculative, isn't that so? 
"A. Yes" (R. 324). 
The State called Ezra C. Knowlton as its next witness. 
Mr. Knowlton was the Executive Vice President of the Utah 
Sand and Gravel Company, the largest such operation in the 
Salt Lake Valley (R. 343). The witness explained the dif-
ference between so called "muck sand" and "blending sand;" 
(R. 342) ; as to his company's sale of "muck sand" (R. 344). 
That: 
"A. We have never sold as much as 5000 yards 
a year-! had better say, 5000 tons a year. 'Ve sell 
in tons. 
"Q. Never more than 5000 tons a year from 
your plant? 
"A. That's right-muck sand. 
"Q. Now have you had occasion to examine the 
so-called Noble properties north of your plant there? 
"A. Yes, I visited that property a few times. 
"Q. Have you been on the property and noticed 
the nature of the deposit of the sand? 
"A. Just in general. 
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"Q. Is that muck sand or is it blending sand? 
"A. Mainly on the bottom, in my judgment, 
the lower levels are more nearly muck sand type. 
The higher levels, based upon my observations, are 
more of the blending sand type. 
"Q. There is no big demand for this muck sand 
in the Salt Lake Valley? 
"A. There have been no requests made of us 
for any large quantity of muck sand. 
"Q. Do you anticipate there will be any need 
for large quantities of that sand? 
"A. Not of that particular type, I don't" (R. 
344). 
The witness testified as to the price of land comparable to 
that of the Noble property: 
"Q. Have you had an opportunity to purchase 
any land that is comparable, that is in the same 
vicinity of this Noble property? 
"A. Once, in one case we had an offer made 
to us of land in that general neighborhood. 
"Q. \Vhat was that offer? 
"A. That was $1000 per acre. 
"Q. Did you accept the offer? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Why not? 
"A. We did not consider it valuable enough for 
our uses to justify making the purchase" (R. 346). 
And, as to the manner in which a gravel pit should be de-
veloped in order to preserve abutting properties ( R. 346, 
347); as to the feasibility of excavating to a depth of 40 
feet on the Noble properties (R. 348). The Court did not 
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permit the witness to testify as to preservation of the prop-
erty to put it to its highest and best possible use. From the 
record: 
"Q. What I mean, if he were to excavate to 
40 feet, what value, if any, would the land have? 
"A. Assuming that the land could be excavated 
40 feet, in my judgment it would have no value for 
any other use. It would just be a hole in the ground, 
unless it were backfilled. 
"Q. Now if it were to be backfilled, what 
would that cost, in relation to the value you might 
get out of removing that material? 
"MR. MAW: I object to that on the ground, 
your Honor, that we are placing no value whatso-
ever on the hole in the ground, and are not propos-
ing that it shall be filled. Our whole value is the 
sand and gravel in it, and we have not presented any 
evidence that we are asking for one penny for the 
land after the sand and gravel has been removed. 
"MR. BUDGE: If the Court please, the State's 
theory is this, that when you appraise land-and we 
have asked our appraisers to do it according to the 
Rule Book and according to their training and edu-
cation-when you appraise land you appraise its 
highest and best possible uses, and in that respect we 
want to know how much it would cost to re-fill this 
hole, because we think the land has a potentially 
higher and better use than a hole in the earth. 
"THE COURT: If they do not claim it you 
have no reason to go into it. 
"MR. BUDGE: We think the highest and best 
use is not to dig that hole there. 
"MR. MAW: You are proving it has no value 
at all, apparently, to fill the hole, and we will agree 
with you. We are not going to fill the hole. 
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"THE COURT: The objection is sustained" (R. 
348, 349). 
On cross examination the witness said his firm was paying 
10c per ton for blending sand as of July 22, 1955 (R. 352). 
The witness's company had on hand a supply of 100,000 
tons of muck sand (R. 357); the company was selling 
blending sand for .04c a cubic yard in place (R. 358). On 
re-direct examination the witness testified that from his 
company's past experience the 100,000 yards of muck sand 
on hand was sufficient for a 20 year supply (R. 361). The 
witness's company declined Noble's offer to sell them sand 
at 20c a yard (R. 368). 
The State then called Werner Kiepe to the stand and 
qualified the witness as an expert appraiser (R. 368, 369). 
The witness stated that he had been employed by the State 
Road Commission to appraise the Noble property to de-
termine its fair market value (R. 369, 370) as of July 22, 
1955 (R. 373) ; the witness gave his opinion as to the high-
est and best use of the property (R. 376, 378, 379) ; the 
witness testified as to the present value of $1.00 which 
could not be "captured" for 15 years, that it would be 38c 
(R. 380, 381); the witness explained to the jury the mode 
and manner of his appraisal of the Noble property (R. 381-
393) and stated his opinion as to the fair market value 
which a person willing to sell, but not required to sell, would 
sell to a person willing to buy, but not required to buy, as 
of the 22nd day of July, 1955 (R. 393). It was the witness's 
opinion that the fair market value of the whole of the prop-
erties was $56,900 (R. 393). 
-- ---·--·~=~·,·-------------
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C. Francis Solomon, Jr. called by the State and duly 
qualified as an appraiser of realty testified: 
(a) That he had been employed by the State Road 
Commission to appraise the Noble property (R. 475). 
(b) That his appraisal was based upon the "highest 
and best use" of the condemned property (R. 479). 
(c) That in his opinion the fair market value of the 
Noble property as of July 22, 1955 was $72,000.00 (R. 494). 
The witness fully explained the processes used in the 
development of the facts upon which his opinion was based 
(R. 479-494). There was no cross examination (R. 496). 
The State rests. 
The defendants called in rebuttal Olive Zaharias who 
testified that she owned the property immediately to the 
south of the Noble property and that she had an agreement 
[through the attorney] with Mr. Noble whereby the parties 
were relieved of maintaining a lateral support between their 
properties (R. 496, 497, 498). 
Brack Howard Noble recalled as a rebuttal witness 
proffered testimony and evidence as to a past sale of ma-
terials from the premises and as to his interest in an ad-
jacent right of way (R. 498-506). 
The State's witness, Douglas H. Larsen, was called by 
the defendants in rebuttal and was interrogated as to the 
prospective demand for sand and gravel for road construc-
tion (R. 506-512). 
The cause was argued and submitted to the jury. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT LANDOWNER FAILED TO 
SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO 
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THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROP-
ERTY TAKEN AND THE EVIDENCE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
OF THE JURY. 
POINT II. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ADMIT 
EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE. ON MARKET 
VALUE WHICH WAS BASED SOLELY ON 
VALUES OF THE COMPONENT PARTS OF 
THE WHOLE ESTATE. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRE-
TION IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE DEFEN-
DANTS' EXHIBITS 28 THROUGH 41. 
POINT IV. 
IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT THE JURY TO 
CONSIDER DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT NO. 56 
TO ESTABLISH FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS 
HOWA AS TO THE MARKET VALUE OF 
SAND AND GRAVEL. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT LANDOWNER FAILED TO 
SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO 
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROP-
ERTY TAKEN AND THE EVIDENCE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
OF THE JURY. 
The general rule is that the burden of showing the 
damages which the landowner will suffer rests on him. 29 
C. J. S., Eminent Domain, Sec. 271. [See Note 82 and cases 
there cited; also 1956 Annual Pocket Part, citing State v. 
Coop. Security Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints, et al., ... Utah ... , 247 P. 2d 269.] In Tanner 
v. Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company, et al., 40 U. 
105, 118; 121 P. 584, aff'd. 239 U. S. 323, 60 L. Ed. 307,36 
S. Ct. 101, our Court said: 
"* * * Under the practice in force in this 
jurisdiction, the burden of establishing the quantum 
of damages was upon the appellants [Condemnee]. 
* * *" 
There appears to be no later expression of the court on this 
proposition and the general rule is apparently the existing 
rule in this state: the burden of proof was upon the de-
fendant Noble to prove the "quantum" of his damages. It 
was defendants' contention that the value of his property 
taken was $300,000.00; the opinions of his expert witnesses 
were, Gaddis, $270,768.00; Rideout, $270,000.00. We think 
the evidence adduced failed entirely to sustain any of these 
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amounts nor does it sustain the verdict of the jury for the 
sum of $150,000.00. 
The opinion testimony of the experts for the defen-
dants was based on premises not established by the the evi-
dence and such opinion testimony cannot, therefore, support 
the verdict. Provo River Water User's Ass'n. v. Carlson, 
... U .... , 133 P. 2d 777, 781. Witness for the defendant 
Mr. Joseph P. Howa, "Civil engineer" (R. 240), "Construc-
tion estimator" (R. 240), "Chief estimator", appraiser of 
"structures already completed," and appraiser of the May-
flower Apartments," (R. 241, 242) whowasnot an appraiser 
(R. 258), and who did not "evaluate property" (R. 262), and 
who did not know what the "fair market value" was, and 
did not "know what a willing purchaser would pay," (R. 
264) testified as to the "replacement cost less depreciation" 
but, including "profit and overhead" (R. 263) of the im-
provements on the Noble property. This was not the "fair 
market value" upon which the expert witnesses for the 
defendant could assume what a "willing purchaser, able to 
buy but not required to buy, would pay to a willing seller, 
not required to sell, for the property." 
"An opinion of market value must necessarily 
be intended to fix the value at which the property 
ought to give a fair return if sold to someone who 
is willing to purchase under ordinary selling condi-
tions." 
Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros. Ass'n., 92 U. 577, 70 P. 
2d 738, 741. "Fair [market] value" and "replacement val-
ue" are not necessarily the same as respects measure of 
damages. Givens v. Gilmore Drug Co., 10 A. 2d 12, 337 Pa. 
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278. No assumption concerning the "replacement value" of 
the improvements on the defendants' lands could reasonably 
or at all support an opinion as to the "fair market value" 
of the property. The defendants' witnesses Gaddis and 
Rideout both based their opinion as to fair market value 
on the replacement values of the improvements to the realty; 
having been specifically asked to do so. Gaddis, (R. 275, 
277) ; Rideout, (R. 283, 286). 
POINT II. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ADMIT 
EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE ON MARKET 
VALUE WHICH WAS BASED SOLELY ON 
VALUES OF THE COMPONENT PARTS OF 
THE WHOLE ESTATE. 
Over plaintiff's objections the expert witnesses were 
permitted to testify as to the fair market value of defen-
dants' property based upon individual estimates of the 
values of the separate parts thereof. Both Mr. Gaddis and 
Mr. Rideout, admittedly as to each, stated their opinion as 
to fair market value was based entirely upon: 
"(a) Mr. Richards' testimony as to the quan-
tity of the materials, sand and gravel. 
"(b) Mr. Schoenfeld's valuation per cubic 
yard, or per ton, of sand and gravel. 
"(c) Mr. Howa's replacement cost value of 
the improvements. 
" (d) Their independent opinion as to the val-
ue per front foot of the property." 
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Thus, by assuming there were 355,222 tons of muck sand 
and 944,646 tons of sand and gravel (Richards) and that 
the muck sand had a value of 25c per ton in place and that 
the sand and gravel had a value of 10c per ton in place (R. 
222) (Schoenfeld), or, 25c times 355,222 equals $88,805.50 
and 944,646 times 10c equals $94,464.60, added together, 
$183,270.10; (Gaddis $183,269.00-R. 278) and by assuming 
that the "replacement" cost of the improvements would be 
$44,795.00 (Gaddis R. 277) (Rideout R. 283) and, based 
upon the witnesses'· "own" opinions, 595 front feet at 
$75.00 per front foot, (Gaddis R. 272) (Rideout R. 282) 
amounts to $44,625.00, so: 
then 
$183,270.10 for sand, gravel and muck sand: 
44,795.00 for replacement cost of improvements: 
44,625.00 for front footage value: 
$272,690.10 would be the value of the land taken. 
Rounded out by Mr. Gaddis to $270,768.00 and by Mr. 
Rideout to $270,000.00 and "opined" by the "estimator" Mr. 
Howa to be between $250,000.00 and $275,000.00 dollars. 
The test as to "fair market value to the condemnee" as 
announced in State v. Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 251; 291 P. 2d 
1028, cannot be met in any such manner. That case holds, 
in part: 
"A condemnee is not entitled to realize a profit 
on his property. It must go to the condemnor for 
its fair market value, as is, irrespective of any 
claimed value based on an aggregate of values 
* * *" 
The true test is the market value of the land and not 
the market price of the sand and gravel that might be· re-
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moved. National Brick Co. v. U.S., 131 F. 2d 30. It is said 
in 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., Section 13.22 
(2) at page 248, that: 
"In applying the valuation process to mineral 
deposits in place it has been held improper to deter-
mine the value thereof by using the product of the 
estimated amount of the deposit and a fixed price 
per unit. In the first place the estimate as to quan-
tity has been considered too speculative and uncer-
tain to merit consideration. In view of the contin-
gencies and uncertainties of business in general, 
there can, in such case, be no certain estimate of 
the cost and potential profits. Undoubtedly, proof 
as to the quantity and quality of a mineral deposit 
is important as is also the cost of extracting it and 
processing it for the market. However, these are 
elements only to be considered with others in deter-
mining the value of the property. There is no limit 
to the value of a quarry or sand bank or clay bank, 
if an estimate can be made of the amount of stone, 
sand, or clay which can be taken, and a fixed price 
put upon it. Such computation ignores to some 
extent the loss and contingencies of the business. 
Consideration should, of course, be given to the na-
ture of the property-that it is in a locality where 
there are valuable mineral deposits and that it has 
a value greater than farming lands-and evidence 
may be adduced as to the quality and quantity of the 
deposit. But the valuation must not be predicated 
upon such facts only. Such factors are proper when 
treated only as contributory factors to the ascertain-
ment of market value rather than as the criterion 
thereof. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
The amount of the sand and gravel in place and the present 
day price, or the prospective price for which it might in the 
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near or distant future be sold, is no criteria of the market 
value of the property. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRE-
TION IN ADlVIITTING IN EVIDENCE DEF'EN-
DANTS' EXHIBITS 28 THROUGH 41. 
The exhibits here complained of appear to be "blown 
up", "colored" or "tinted" photographs. They were ad-
mitted in evidence over timely objections (R. 147, 148; 165). 
As a general rule whenever it is relevant to describe 
a person, place, or thing, photographs or pictures are ad-
missible for the purpose of explaining and applying the 
evidence and assisting the Court or jury in understanding 
the case. 32 C. J. S., Evidence, Sec. 709. The Court has 
stated that rule thusly: 
"It is a well-settled rule that photographic 
views, when proved to be correct representation of 
person, objects, or localities which are subject mat-
ters of inquiry in an action or proceeding, are ad-
missible in evidence to aid the court or jury to apply 
the facts proved to the particular case." (Emphasis 
added.) Johnson v. Railroad, 35 U. 285, 294, 100 
Pac. 390; State v. 1Woods, 62 U. 397, 410, 220 Pac. 
215. 
With this rule appellant has no quarrel. The practice of 
admitting photographs in all proper cases should be encour-
aged. Conn v. Oregon Electric Ry. Co., 300 P. 342, 346, 137 
Ore. 75. In condemnation proceedings photographs should 
be admitted in support of testimony to establish value. 
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State ex rel. McKelvey, Commissioner v. Styner, et ol., 
(Ida.) 72 P. 2d 699. Not so when the photographs are 
deceptive; McKee v. Chase, 253 P. 2d 787, 792, 73 Ida. 491, 
or, if a photograph is inaccurate, distorted or misleading. 
Cabonargi v. Jordan, 100 N. E. 2d 496, 344 Ill. App. 276. 
Photographs, 
"* * * should be excluded where they would 
confuse or mislead rather than aid the jury, * * * 
or unduly emphasize the claims or the evidence of 
one of the parties * * * " 
32 C. J. S., Evidence, Sec. 709, p. 612. 
[See, generally, American Digest System, Evidence, Key 
359, (1) (3) .] In Metcalfe v. Winchester (Wyo.) 262 P. 
2d 404, 412, that court said: 
"* * * The pertinent question was, did the 
photographs show accurately the condition of the 
ground * * *." (Emphasis from the opinion.) 
For other recent cases generally in support of the argument 
presented here, see: Leflin v. Howard, 82 So. 2d 125; 
Vugovich v. Chicago Transit Authority, 126 N. E. 2d 731, 
6 Ill. App. 2d 115; American Rubber Corp. v. JoUey, 72 So. 
2d 102, 260 Ala. 600; Godvig v. Lopez, (Ore.) 202 P. 2d 
935; Lee v. Crittenden County, 226 S. W. 2d 79; Pozos v. 
Rivero, 225 S. W. 2d 935; Orr v. Columbus and GreenviUe 
R. R. Co., 48 So. 2d 630; photographs which are true repre-
sentations are generally admitted in evidence, Pilgeram v. 
Haas, (Mont.) 167 P. 2d 339; Bailey v. Greeley General 
Warehouse Co., 83 N. E. 2d 244; it is error to admit in evi-
dence pictures which are not a faithful reproduction, State 
v. Miller, 43 Ore. 325, 74 Pac. 658. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
Admitting or refusing to admit photographs in evidence 
is a matter of discretion with the trial court which will not 
be disturbed unless abused. The cases so holding are almost 
without number and the rule so well established that we 
feel no need to consume space in citing the authorities so 
holding. [See American Digest System, Appeal and Error, 
key 970 (2) and Evidence, key 359 (1) .] Did the Court 
below then so abuse its discretion as to require that a new 
trial be granted in the case at bar? Appellant thinks so. 
The exhibits complained of do not accurately portray 
or represent the premises as they looked and were when 
taken by condemnation; or in fact at anytime either prior 
or subsequent thereto. They are "posed" photos and so "col-
ored" as to completely destroy the actual likeness or repre-
sentation of what they purport to be the subject of. This 
Court has said : 
"* * * As a matter of course, before a pho-
tograph is admissible * * * it must be made to 
appear that it is a true or correct picture or repre-
sentation of the object photographed * * *" 
Blake v. Harding, 54 U. 158, 180 P. 172. 
In the Blake case, the purpose of the exhibit was admittedly 
to aid the jury to better understand and appreciate the 
evidence relating to the value of property. The Court held 
the photograph should have been admitted for that purpose, 
subject as a matter of course to it being a true representa-
tion. It would seem fundamental to a sense of justice that 
such should be the rule. 
At the time of trial and when the jury viewed the 
premises all improvements had been removed from the land. 
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The jurors were able to see only the bare mountainside and 
excavated roadway; therefore, the evidence as to the im-
provements could best be explained by the use of pictures 
in support of the testimony. Appellant's expert appraisers 
described the improvements and there were offered and 
admitted pictures in support thereof, we claim that proper. 
The complaint registered here goes only to the obvious mis-
representation as to appearances and values which these 
exhibits portray. The Court abused its discretion in ad-
mitting the colored photographs to the prejudice of plain-
tiff's cause. 
POINT IV. 
IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT THE JURY TO 
CONSIDER DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT NO. 56 
TO ESTABLISH FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
Defendant placed into evidence a photostatic copy of 
a warranty deed (R. 468) as evidence of the purchase by 
the State Road Commission of 9.45 acres of land which was 
properly adjacent to defendant's holdings. This was a 
negotiated sale (R. 463), the purchase price $80,000.00. 
Proof of said sale was not competent evidence to establish 
fair market value. This court has so held: 
"Appellants offered in evidence the testimony 
of another landowner of the vicinity. They sought to 
prove the value of the Ritchie land taken by proving 
what this other owner had received from the County 
for his land for the same project. However, on voir 
dire it was disclosed that the sum of money this 
landowner received included damages to his remain-
ing land. The court ruled out the testimony of this 
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witness upon the ground that it was not proper evi-
dence of value. Under the authorities we think this 
was correct. Although the decisions divide upon the 
question of admissibility of amounts paid by the 
condemner for other lands, there is little disagree-
ment that compromise settlements, including damages, 
are not admissible. The proposed testimony did not 
segregate the sale price from the damages. It is 
questionable whether the price, had it been segre-
gated, would have been proper testimony under the 
definition of market value as applicable to condem-
nation proceedings. 18 Am. Jur. p. 996, Sec. 352 and 
cases cited thereunder. Generally see 118 A. L. R. 
869, citing Telluride Power Co. v. Bruneau, 41 Utah 
4, 125 P. 399, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 1251." 
Weber County, et al. v. Ritchie, et ux., 98 Utah 
272, 96 P. 2d 744. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS 
HOWA AS TO THE MARKET VALUE OF 
SAND AND GRAVEL. 
A qualified witness can testify as to the value of realty. 
Under the decisions of the courts, an unqualified witness 
cannot. 32 C. J. S., Evidence, Sec. 545, p. 299, 300. The 
defendants' witness "Howa" testified on cross-examination: 
"BY MR. BUDGE: 
"Q. That figure that you just gave us, 250 to 
275 thousand dollars, Mr. Howa, you hesitated quite 
some time. Is this the first time that you have set 
a price on that property? 
"A. No, sir. 
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"Q. Did you have a figure of 250 to 275 thou-
sand dollars, when you came in this courtroom? 
"A. No, sir, I had it before I came here-
months before. 
"Q. You have had this decision for several 
months; you knew that is what your answer would 
be to this question; is that right? 
"A. No, sir, I arrived at that by experience in 
the field I am in. 
"Q. That is not what I asked you now. 
"A. I basically am judging my price on what 
the material is worth out in that area. 
"Q. That is just fine. I am glad you are doing 
it that way, but what I ask you was, did you under-
stand when you came into the Courtroom, when you 
were asked the total value of the property, it was 
going to be 250 to 275 thousand dollars ; did you 
have that figure in mind when you came into the 
courtroom? 
"A. I analyzed it, yes. 
"Q. You knew that is what you were going to 
answer when you came in here? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. That time you took then, you were not 
figuring it up in your head then, at that time? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Now which was it; did you know, or did 
you figure it up just now while you were sitting 
there? 
"A. I approximated that price, as I said, by 
what I have purchased in sand and gravel from that 
area. 
"Q. I asked you, if you, when you came in here 
to testify, under oath, you were prepared to swear 
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that in your opinion that land was worth from 250 
to 275 thousand dollars. That is all I asked you. 
Were you prepared to swear to that when you 
walked into this courtroom? 
"A. After hearing the testimony on the yard-
age of sand and gravel, I had the opinion what I 
just said. 
"Q. Oh, you didn't know anything about the 
yardage until the time you came into this courtroom? 
"A. Yes, I heard it-I heard the testimony. 
"Q. You heard the testimony in court; you 
did not know anything about the yardage ; you don't 
know anything about the yardage, do you? 
"A. Yes, I have heard the total yardage before 
we came into court, from a paper Mr. Maw had 
given us on the yardage. 
"Q. Oh, Mr. Maw showed you how many yards 
were out there? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. But you are an expert, and appraiser, 
aren't you? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. You are not an appraiser? 
"A. Not on sand and gravel. 
"Q. Then I don't suppose if you are not an 
expert appraiser in sand and gravel, your testimony 
as to the value of that sand and gravel isn't any 
good at all to this jury, the court or me, and I will 
ask the court to have it stricken. 
"MR. MAW: Just a minute. May I ask a ques-
tion? 
"THE COURT: The motion is denied. You can 
show the value by cross-examination, but it is too 
late to strike it." (Emphasis added. (R. 256, 7, 8). 
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The witness was admittedly not qualified to testify as to 
the value of the gravel deposit and the objection thereto of 
plaintiff should have been sustained. The witness could not 
form an opinion any better than that of the jury or men in 
general. This court has said: 
"* * * The witness is asked, not for his 
knowledge of transactions involving the property, 
but for his opinion, which involves a judgment which 
may be the result of a number of factors including 
knowledge of transactions. The witness must not 
be a mere transmitter of information. Any of us 
can do that. He must be able to give a judgment 
based on knowledge of values * * *." (Empha-
sis added.) Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National 
Bank Building Co., 89 U. 456, 500; 57 P. 2d 1099. 
We are not unmindful of the opinion of Mr. Justice Crock-
ett, dissenting, in Utah Coop Ass'n. v. White Distrib. and 
Supply Co., 2 U. 2d 391, 400; 275 P. 2d 687. However, this 
was not an issue for the trial court's determination of the 
"credibility" of the witness's testimony-the question here 
is, did the court abuse its discretion in permitting an un-
qualified witness to express an opinion as to value to the 
jury? The answer can only be, yes. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the evidence of the State established the fair 
market value for the N able properties at their highest and 
best use, based upon the willing seller and the willing buyer 
doctrine, and, since the defendants failed to carry the bur-
den of proof as to the quantum of damages, this cause 
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should be remanded to the court below with instructions 
to enter judgment for the defendants in the principal sum 
of $72,000.00 plus interest thereon from the date of the 
taking, together with costs. Should defendants refuse to 
accept such sum the cause should be re-tried. We so conclude. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
W. L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
ROBERT B. PORTER, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
K. ROGER BEAN, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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